This paper develops a model of pricing dynamics in business to business relationships. The formation of business relationships is a process of search and matching between retailers and wholesalers in the product market. The size of each transaction and the related price are set through bilateral bargaining. There are three key factors that in ‡uence the reaction of prices and quantities to cost shocks: the persistence of the shocks, the adjustment of …nal goods production and the search externalities. These factors determine how …rms adjust, whether through the intensive margin, through the extensive margin or through both. Based on this, we assess to what extent wholesale prices a¤ect the allocation of consumption in closed economy and deliver expenditure switching in open economy.
Introduction
Empirical studies document that marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to prices at the …rm level and that prices are substantially less volatile than costs. 1 This is in stark contrast with the monopolistic competition framework usually embedded in macroeconomic models, the one developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , which implies a complete pass-through of costs to prices. Various theories have been proposed to justify the evidence that prices are more stable than costs. For example, recent literature has attributed the low degree of pass-through of exchange rate shocks to prices to either local distribution costs, markup adjustments (due, for instance, to a variable elasticity of demand) or pure nominal rigidities (menu costs). 2 In this paper we study to what extent product market frictions, bargaining and search externalities can explain real price rigidity. Our analysis is based on two key assumptions.
First, both retail …rms and wholesale producers spend resources to engage in new long-term business relationships. Second, once a business relationship is formed, both the wholesale price and the quantity of the good exchanged are bargained between wholesalers and retailers.
There is a vast empirical evidence on the importance of business to business (B2B) longterm relationships and product market imperfections. For example, Blinder et al. (1998) …nd that 85 percent of the U.S. …rms surveyed engage mightily in long-term relationships with their customers and that 77 percent of their customers are other …rms. These long-term relationships are mainly governed by contracts, and these contracts typically last for one year. 3 As noted by Matha and Pierrard (2011) , …rms allocate a non-negligible amount of resources in the search for customers or suppliers. In 2006, advertising, marketing and promotion activities in the U.S.
amounted to around 600,000 jobs, that is, to almost 0.5 percent of total U.S. employment. A similar amount of people were engaged in purchasing and buying occupations. Moreover, annual expenditures in all media advertising averaged 2.5 percent of U.S. GDP over the last decade.
Empirically, price negotiations between …rms seem to be the rule rather than the exception.
wholesalers. The resulting B2B relationships lead to contracts for the exchange of intermediate goods, and the volume of the trade depends on two margins of adjustment: an extensive margin (the number of customers) and an intensive margin (the quantity exchanged in each match).
The search costs govern the extensive margin of adjustment and generate a surplus within each match. Retailers and wholesalers bargain over this surplus, setting wholesale prices and quantities in accordance with their relative bargaining power.
Our analysis highlights that wholesale prices and retail prices play di¤erent roles in industry dynamics. Wholesale prices have to do mainly with the distribution of the rents between the two parties in a contract, whereas retail prices are a re ‡ection of the costs of rapidly adjusting marketing and distribution infrastructures for the sale of …nal goods. Speci…cally, studying the response of variables to marginal costs shocks, we …nd that the pass-through to wholesale and retail prices depends on: the persistence of the shock, the elasticity of the demand of retailers for wholesale goods along the intensive margin, and the bargaining power of retailers.
The persistence of cost shocks determines the incentives for …rms to invest in new business relationships. After a cost shock, …rms can increase production either by increasing the trade per match, by forming new business relationships or by partially adjusting along both margins.
But, due to search costs, setting up new B2B relationships is a di¢ cult task. In the model, …rms …nd this option convenient only if the cost shock is persistent enough. Otherwise, …rms tend to adjust only along the intensive margin. The cost of the adjustment along the intensive margin is thus the foremost factor of the pass-through if the cost shock is transitory.
The sensitivity of both wholesale prices and retail prices to cost shocks depends on retailers' bargaining power. While the pass-through to wholesale prices is forcefully increasing in retailers' bargaining power, the pass-through to retail prices is non-monotonically and weakly related to the bargaining power. The reason for this non-monotonic and weak e¤ect is that the bargaining power a¤ects the distribution of the rents between wholesalers and retailers but not the reaction of consumer prices to cost shocks.
The repeated nature of the interactions between …rms points towards an intriguing issue:
observed wholesale prices may not be allocative, in the sense that they may not a¤ect the retail prices faced by consumers nor their consumption decisions. This issue is very relevant, especially in light of the recent empirical evidence, which suggests that nominal price stickiness arises mainly at the wholesale rather than at the retail level. In fact, as recognized at least since Barro (1977) , the stabilizing role of monetary policy when prices are sticky depends crucially on prices being allocative. The B2B model provides a natural laboratory to address this issue.
We show that wholesale prices have no direct in ‡uence on the intensive margin of trade, but a¤ect the value of business relationships and thus the incentive to engage in search activities.
For this reason, the allocative power of wholesale prices depends on the perceived persistence of the price change, and on the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The allocative power is large and persistent if changes in wholesale prices are long-lasting and search externalities are substantial.
But in all other cases wholesale prices have a rather small allocative power, much smaller than what the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model implies.
The limited allocative power of intermediate goods prices has very interesting implications
for trade in open economy, where B2B relationships and bargaining are pervasive (Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008) . The empirical literature has largely analyzed the degree of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to import prices, often to quantify the expenditure switching e¤ect of changes in the exchange rate. 8 The expenditure switching channel implicitly assumes that a shock to the exchange rate a¤ects the consumption of imported goods only to the extent that it translates into the variability of import prices. This can be true only if prices are allocative.
To address this issue, in the last part of the paper we present a simple open economy extension of our model. In the extended model, domestic wholesalers need to establish customer relationships with both local retailers and foreign retailers. We …nd that, even in situations in which the allocative power of wholesale prices is low, exchange rate shocks maintain a signi…cant expenditure switching e¤ect. In fact, exchange rate changes a¤ect the total surplus of international transactions and, consequently, have direct e¤ect on the intensive margin of trade. This is independent of the reaction of the bargained price, so that the overall amount of expenditure switching is more a function of the costs of adjusting trade along the extensive and intensive margins than of the ERPT to border (wholesale) prices. We conclude that focusing only on the degree of ERPT to measure the expenditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate shocks can be misleading for industries where long-term relationships and bargaining are widespread.
Our work is related to a growing literature that investigates the role of long-term relationships for price and business cycle dynamics. 9 Most of these works focus on the relationship between a …nal consumer and a …rm, not between two …rms. This is conceptually important, for bargaining between …rms is arguably more realistic than bargaining between a …rm and a consumer.
Our paper builds on Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Matha and Pierrard (2011) . Both of these works extend macroeconomic frameworks to include search frictions in the product market.
Drozd and Nosal (2012) do so in an international business cycle model, to explain the deviation of the prices of internationally traded goods from the law of one price. Matha and Pierrard (2011) provide some evidence on the relevance of B2B relationships and introduce them in the model by King and Rebelo (1999) , to study the e¤ect on standard real business cycle dynamics.
Our work di¤ers from theirs in two important dimensions. First, we focus on industry dynamics.
This approach is useful to identify the principal industry-level determinants of incomplete passthrough and can be easily related to the empirical literature on pass-through. Second, we address a di¤erent question. We carefully study how the intensive margin of adjustment a¤ects the passthrough of cost shocks to prices, and then analyze the role played by wholesale prices in the adjustment of quantities to marginal cost shocks and exchange rate shocks.
Finally, our paper is close, in spirit, to Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) , who develop a static bargaining model between one …nal good producer and a number of intermediate good suppliers.
This model is used as a micro-foundation for a quantitative analysis with variable markups at the wholesale level but constant markups at the retail level. Our paper shares with Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) the idea that introducing negotiations between …rms is key to understand pricing dynamics, but di¤ers in many important aspects. Most prominently, our model is dynamic and takes into account the need for …rms to invest in building new long-term relationships.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we derive the benchmark closedeconomy model. In Section 3 we examine the e¤ects of cost shocks on industry dynamics and the pass-through to wholesale and retail prices. Based on these …ndings, Section 4 focuses on the role of trading frictions and bargaining and on the allocative power of wholesale prices. Section 5 is devoted to the open economy extension, and Section 6 concludes. 9 To cite a few, recent works include Hall (2008) 
Model
Let us consider a generic industry where wholesale …rms produce intermediate goods. Retailers transform these products in …nal consumption goods and sell them to households. Retailers are perfectly competitive …rms, but the interaction between retailers and wholesalers is subject to trade frictions. Both types of …rms need to search in order to …nd a party to make deals with, and contracts are signed after bilateral bargaining. The search and matching scheme is the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model.
Demand for Retail Goods
The economy is composed of a continuum of sectors (or industries), each producing a speci…c good. The demand for the good produced in industry i is given by
where > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between good i and the good produced in any other industry. P t and C t , respectively, denote the aggregate price and consumption levels. Since we focus on industry dynamics, we follow Ravn et al. (2010) and take P t and C t as given. This simpli…es the demand function for good i to
where A is a positive constant.
In industry i, retail …rms sell di¤erent brands of the same good. But, di¤erently from the case of goods across industries, we assume that brands (within each industry) are perfectly substitutable. We borrow this assumption from Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009) . Consistently with our focus on a generic industry, we drop the industry-speci…c index i from the rest of the paper.
Search and Matching
Trade of intermediate products within the industry is the result of long-term relationships between …rms. At time t, the total number of existing B2B relationships, T t , is given by the following law of motion:
where is the exogenous rate at which business relationships are destroyed and M t is the number of new B2B relationships. T t is a state of the product market, for it usually takes time (one month, under our calibration) to establish a business relationship, and this is meant to last for a long time before ending (stochastically).
M t is a constant return to scale aggregator of retailers'search e¤ort d t (e.g., purchase managers'e¤ort) and wholesalers'search e¤ort a t (advertising and marketing):
wherem > 0 and 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the wholesalers. The rate at which a retailer can start a new relationship with a wholesaler is k R ( t ) = M t =d t =m t , where t a t =d t is the product market tightness of the industry-the ratio of advertisement e¤ort per purchasing e¤ort. For a wholesaler, the probability of being successfully matched with a retailer is instead k a ( t ) = M t =a t =m ( t ) (1 ) .
Within each match, retailers purchase q t units of intermediate inputs, so the overall trade volume in the market comprises both an extensive margin (given by T t ) and an intensive margin (given by q t ).
Wholesale Firms
There is a continuum of wholesale …rms, each indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. Each wholesaler expends resources and time to …nd buyers for its products; these search costs are convex in the search intensity of the wholesaler x wt (j) = a t (j) =T t (j) and given by:
where > 0. Modelling the search cost in terms of the search intensity has a great advantage for our purpose here. It shuts down the so-called intra…rm bargaining-a feature we are not interested in-because the bargained price is going to be independent of the number of B2B relationships. 10 Therefore, the pro…ts of wholesaler j are the pro…ts from sales net of the search costs:
where p W t (j) is the price of each intermediate good variety and mc t is the corresponding marginal cost. We assume that the marginal cost is exogenous and independent of scale. A shock to mc t is an industry-level shock. The objective of the wholesaler is thus to choose the level of search e¤ort and the number of relationships that maximize current and future pro…ts:
and for a given initial condition T 0 (j) > 0; 2 (0; 1) is a constant discount factor. 11 The wholesaler solves this problem by taking the number of matches per unit of e¤ort k a ( t ) as given, while p W t (j) and q t (j) are decided after the successful match with retailers.
The solution to the maximization problem gives the following …rst order conditions:
where W t (j) @ w (T t (j) ; mc t ) =@T t (j) denotes the marginal value of business relationships to the j-th wholesaler. The …rst condition equates the expected search cost of an additional match (the left hand side) to its expected bene…t. In the second condition, W t (j) is the sum of three elements: the total pro…t from established relationships, the savings in the costs of establishing 1 0 This speci…cation of the search cost is a simpli…cation of the bargaining problem, which has been used in the labor search literature by Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Thomas (2008) for the same purpose of abstracting from intra…rm bargaining. 1 1 In a full- ‡edged general equilibrium model, the discount factor of the …rm would be an endogenous variable given by the representative household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. See also Ravn et al. (2010) . new matches, (x wt (j)) 2 =2, and the expected future value of the relationships.
Note that, because of the search frictions, wholesalers' pro…t maximization is not a static problem but an intertemporal choice. To see this even more clearly, combine equations (4) (5), which yields:
That is, it is optimal to search for buyers insofar as the search costs-relative to the probability of a successful match-equal all the future expected bene…ts from the long-term relationships that can be formed.
Retail Firms
There are an in…nite number of retailers intermediating between wholesale producers and …nal consumers; retailers are indexed by r 2 [0; 1]. As any wholesaler, the r-th retailer chooses how much to invest in the formation of new business relationships, and this is captured by the search rate x Rt (r) = d t (r) =T t (r). The search cost is convex in this search rate:
Once matched with wholesalers, each retailer r has a technology that transforms wholesale goods into retail goods. Importantly, we need to introduce a cost of adjusting the quantity of inputs purchased within each match; this is crucial for …rms to be willing to invest in B2B relationships. If changing q t (r) were costless, …rms would …nd it optimal to have few matches (thus minimizing the search costs) and satisfy changes in demand with changes in q t (r). This would go against the essence of our model, the idea being that …rms must engage in search and matching to expand their production, and would make the problem not well-de…ned.
To address this aspect, we introduce costs in changing the quantity sold per match through the production function of retailers. Speci…cally, we assume that, for each match k, retailers have a technology that transforms q t (k) units of the wholesale good into 
where we have imposed symmetry among the matches. This production function has three main attractive features. First, it displays diminishing returns to q t for (both upwards and downwards) deviations from the technically optimal level q. Second, it introduces an incentive for retailers to buy from di¤erent wholesalers (similar to a love for varieties). Third and most importantly, it is very ‡exible, in that it includes both the linear case and the extensive-margin-only case as special cases. More precisely, for ! 0, the production function is linear in q t (k) and retailers can adjust their production on the intensive margin very easily. For ! 1, q t (k) = q at any time t: the intensive margin is closed, and …rms can adjust production only by establishing new business relationships.
Given (6), the pro…t function of the retailer is
where p t is the price at which the price-taking retailer sells goods to …nal consumers. Therefore, taking the matching probability k R t as given, retailer r solves the following problem:
1 2 A natural alternative would be to endogenize the intensive margin by assuming that each retailer buys di¤erentiated goods from a range of wholesalers and has a 'love of variety'motive (common in the trade literature) that leads him to value buying from many wholesalers in itself. The production function of retailers would be:
with < 1. The main reason why we chose a di¤erent speci…cation is that the production function (6) is more ‡exible, since it nests both the linear case ( ! 0) and the extensive-margin-only case ( ! 1) as special cases. This allows us to analyze more neatly the role of the intensive margin of trade adjustment for the cost pass-through.
and for a given initial condition T 0 (r) > 0.
The optimal solution is given by:
where J t (r) @ R (T t (r) ; mc t ) =@T t (r). The …rst condition equates the expected search costs of an additional match (the left hand side) to its expected bene…t, given by the expected value of a business relationship for a retailer. The second equation determines the marginal value of a business relationship to the retailer as the sum of: the gross pro…ts from an established
, the savings in the costs of establishing a B2B
relationship, and the expected continuation value.
Bargaining
The presence of a surplus associated with existing long-term relationships implies that there are many combinations of wholesale prices and quantities consistent with the equilibrium (Hall, 2005; . Existing B2B relationships are privately e¢ cient as long as they generate a positive surplus for both the parties involved in the bargaining. Therefore, any price path such that W t (j) 0 and J t (r) 0 8t can be an equilibrium path. Interestingly, as emphasized by Hall (2007) , this opens the way for equilibrium sticky prices in customer markets. 13 In line with the labor market literature, the solution to this issue is the surplus sharing solution of a Nash (1950) bargaining problem. 14 Wholesaler and retailer of a bilateral contract …nd a joint solution for the price and quantity of a transaction, so to maximize the Nash product S t (j; r):
where 2 [0; 1] is the bargaining power of retailers. The solution with respect to the wholesale price gives an optimal sharing rule
which implies:
where W t (j; r) = 2 (xwt(j)) 2 qt(j;r) and Rt (j; r) = 2 (x Rt (r)) 2 qt(j;r) are the savings in the costs of forming B2B relationships-per unit of trade-for wholesalers and retailers, respectively.
The wholesale price is an average of two terms, weighted by the bargaining power of the contracting parties. The two terms express not only the costs of production, but also the valuation of retailers. The …rst term, mc t W t (j; r), represents the minimum amount that wholesalers are willing to accept. This depends on marginal costs and on the savings in the cost of forming another business relationship. The second term, p t 1
qt(j;r) + Rt (j; r), represents the maximum price that retailers are willing to pay, which is the sum of retailers' marginal revenues and of retailers'savings in the costs of establishing another B2B relationship.
The bargaining power determines which party gets the most of the surplus.
The optimal sharing rule (11) also implies:
Aggregating across all …rms and taking log-deviations, this gives:
This means that the similarity between the search problem of wholesalers and that of retailers implies a one-to-one relationship between changes in retailers'search e¤ort d t and in wholesalers' e¤ort (â t ). As a consequence, the product market tightness^ t is invariant to marginal cost shocks. But, note, it is not invariant to other innovations that we explore later on in the paper. 15 While the bargained price is set in a way to split the surplus between the two parties in proportion to their bargaining power, wholesalers and retailers choose q t (j; r) in a way to maximize the total surplus from a long term relationship. Speci…cally, the solution of the maximization problem with respect to quantities gives:
Thus, the marginal bene…t of an additional unit sold in the retail market-given by the total pro…t margin p t mc t -needs to be equal to the marginal cost of increasing the quantity per match q t (j; r) above q. This cost is larger, the higher the adjustment cost parameter .
To get further intuition, we can rewrite (13) as:
where tot t (j; r) = pt mct is the total gross mark-up of retail prices over marginal costs. The volume of trade per match is an increasing function of the total pro…t margin of retailers and wholesalers. More importantly, note that the units traded in each match depend directly on the …nal retail price p t but are set independently of the wholesale price p W t ; in fact, p W t does not enter equation (14) . This questions the role played by wholesale prices in the adjustment of trade to cost shocks.
Aggregation and Equilibrium
Industry level relations are found by aggregating across all retailers r and wholesalers j under the assumption of complete symmetry across …rms. For instance, the aggregate consumption of the …nal good of industry i is:
1 5 Speci…cally, the bargaining power shock we study in Section 5 will break the tight link betweendt andât.
All other equations are identical to the individual …rm's case and are therefore not repeated here.
In the symmetric equilibrium all retailers start o¤ with the same number of suppliers, and all wholesalers have similarly the same number of buyers. That is, T 0 (j) = T 0 (r) = T 0 8j; r.
And since …rms are identical on each side of the market, also the initial bargained price and quantity are the same across all the pairs (j; r): p W 0 (j; r) = p W 0 and q 0 (j; r) = q 0 .
Search Externalities and Constrained E¢ cient Allocation
In a decentralized equilibrium, wholesalers and retailers decide their search intensity taking the rates at which additional e¤ort leads to a new match, k a ( t ) and k R ( t ), as given. This way each …rm chooses its optimal level of search without internalizing the e¤ect of its decision on other …rms. Summing up across …rms, this may lead to suboptimal choices at the aggregate level.
The constrained e¢ cient allocation can be found as the solution of the problem of a benevolent social planner who faces the same technological constraints and search frictions that are present in the decentralized equilibrium. 16 
Proposition 1
The decentralized equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient only if the Hosios condition = 1 holds.
Proof. Appendix A.
Proposition 1 requires that social and private gains from participating in a matching process are equal, as retailers' bargaining power equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to retailers' search 1 . Otherwise, either retailers' private gains ( > 1 ) or wholesalers'private gains ( < 1 ) are larger than their respective social gains.
Calibration and Steady State
The model is calibrated at the monthly frequency. The discount rate is 0:996. Following in Ravn et al. (2010) , the elasticity of substitution across industries takes the standard value of 6. We set = 1, as a baseline value for the size of the adjustment costs along the intensive margin. The elasticity of the matching function to wholesalers' marketing e¤ort, , and the bargaining power of retailers, , are both equal to 0:5. This implies that there is complete symmetry between wholesalers and retailers and that the Hosios condition holds. The e¢ ciency of the matching technologym is chosen so that, in steady state, the monthly rate at which search e¤ort leads to new business relationships is k a ( ) = k R ( ) = 0:2. This rate is approximately the monthly equivalent of the quarterly rate of 0:5 used by Matha and Pierrard (2011) . We use a similar strategy for the separation rate . We set it to 0:10, which is slightly higher than the monthly equivalent of the quarterly rate of 0:25 in Matha and Pierrard (2011).
The total markup of retail prices over marginal costs from equation (14) is an endogenous variable in the model. In the long run, this markup is increasing in both retailers'and wholesalers'search costs:
(1 ) . The …rst term shows that the markup is above 1 so long as q di¤ers from the optimal value q ( q = 1 by normalization), that is, so long as there is a positive cost of transforming intermediate goods into …nal goods, !. The second term shows that tot is even
> 0, which is true for reasonable values of the search costs. We assume a long-run total markup of 1:10, and this implies a search e¤ort parameter = 0:3457.
Properties of the steady state. The steady state depends crucially on two parameters:
, the curvature of the demand of retailers for the variety produced by each wholesaler, and , retailers'relative bargaining power. We analyze the sensitivity of the steady state to these two parameters, keeping …xed and letting tot change along with other key variables. The results are in Table 1 .
To start with, consider the impact of the adjustment costs along the intensive margin. If = 100000, the intensive margin is closed: q = q = 1 and the total markup of retail prices over marginal costs is 1:105. With a lower ( = 1), the model displays both intensive and extensive margins of adjustment. Firms optimally trade-o¤ the costs of increasing production along the extensive margin (search and matching costs) with the costs of increasing production along the intensive margin. The steady state stock of business relationships decreases, whereas the quantity sold per match increases to q = 1:091 > q. The higher q depresses prices and markups, which are now (slightly) smaller than before. This result is even stronger if we continue to lower , as …rms progressively lose the incentive to engage in B2B relationships. For = 0:00001, …rms …nd it optimal to have very few matches (T = 0:007) and satisfy changes in demand by adjusting q (q = 144:50). Prices and markups are now both close to 1. Thus, this numerical exercise con…rms that there should be frictions along the intensive margin for …rms to be willing to invest in building B2B relationships.
Consider now the role of the bargaining power of retailers. In the baseline calibration ( = 0:5), the number of B2B relationships is relatively high, and the total markup on a …nal product is around 1:10. Intuitively, since buyers and sellers have the same bargaining power, they make the same search e¤ort and the product market is very ‡uid ( = When wholesalers have a very high bargaining power ( = 0:1), they seize the most of the surplus from a business relationship and their private gains are larger than the socially optimal level. As a consequence, they overinvest in advertising and marketing activities, while retailers have very little interest in searching. In this case, the product market is very 'tight'from the point of view of wholesalers ( = 3), and the process of matching becomes sclerotic (the steady state number of B2B relationships drops). Something similar happens when retailers have most of the bargaining power ( = 0:9), though this time it is retailers that enjoy private bene…ts and overinvest. In fact, given the assumption of complete symmetry in the search problem of retailers and wholesalers, upward and downward deviations of equal size from = 0:5 have the same e¤ects on T and p. The main di¤erence lies in the evolution of the wholesale price p W .
When is high, p W is low and most of the pro…ts go to retailers; when is low, p W is high and wholesalers get most of the rents.
Cost Shocks: Industry Dynamics and Pass-Through
The pass-through of marginal cost shocks is complete if a 1 percent increase in marginal costs leads to a 1 percent increase in prices; otherwise, prices increase by less than marginal costs and the pass-through is incomplete. To determine the degree of pass-through in our model, we look at the reaction of wholesale and retail prices to innovations in the marginal costs of wholesalers.
We assume that the marginal cost shock is industry-speci…c and follows an AR (1) process:
where variables with a 'hat' denote log deviations from steady state, 2 [0; 1) is the serial correlation of marginal costs and " t is an i.i.d. shock. 17 Note that, since …rms are symmetric, we omit …rm-speci…c indexes from now on.
We proceed in two steps. We start with the case of purely transitory cost shocks, when the model has a simple analytical solution, and then pass to the case of persistent cost shocks.
Transitory Cost Shocks
The analytical solution of the model with transitory marginal costs shocks ( = 0) is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If marginal cost shocks c mc t are transitory, i.e. if = 0, the solution of the model is:T t = 0q t = B q c mc tŷt =T t + q tpt = 1 ŷ t implying that the wholesale price equalŝ
[0; 1). B q is the elasticity ofq t to changes in the total pro…t margin, captures the increase in retailers' production due to an increase inq t and A q represents the elasticity of the wholesale 1 7 Our strategy follows Ravn et al. (2010) .
price to changes inq t . 18 Proof. Appendix B.
Put it di¤erently, this proposition indicates that …rms do not have incentives to adjust along the extensive margin when the shock is expected to die out immediately in the near future, and the problem becomes static (i.e.x wt =x Rt =T t = 0). In this case, the response of retail quantities and prices depends on the adjustment costs along the intensive margin. The lower the adjustment cost , the easier it is for retailers to adjust their production and distribution structure. In turn, a strong reduction in the production of retail goods increases retail prices by a factor linked to , the elasticity of the demand for the good produced in the industry. Ceteris paribus, the lower , the higher the pass-through to retail prices. The pass-through to retail prices is complete only if the adjustment along the intensive margin is entirely frictionless (i.e.
for ! 0); otherwise, it is incomplete.
Wholesale prices are a¤ected by three channels. First, there is the direct 'marginal cost channel,' the term mc p W in the proposition above. This term captures the direct in ‡uence of the marginal costs of wholesalers on the bargained price and increases with the bargaining power of retailers. The second channel is related to retailers'reservation price and is given by
This term is larger, the more retail prices react to cost shocks or the higher the bargaining power of wholesalers. The …nal term, A q B q , is the 'bargained quantity e¤ect.'
That is, wholesalers are willing to ask for a lower price insofar as retailers are willing to buy more units of the intermediate good. For instance, an increase in marginal costs provokes a reduction inq t , and this-through the 'bargained quantity e¤ect'-translates into a higher wholesale pricê p W t . This e¤ect is stronger, the lower are and .
Corollary 3 When = 0:
(i) the pass-through to retail prices converges to 1 for ! 0.
(ii) the pass-through to wholesale prices converges to 1 when one of the following conditions is met: 1) ! 0; 2) ! 1.
(iii) wholesale prices only play a distributive role, not an allocative one.
The second point of this corollary is a combined e¤ect of the three channels drivingp W t .
The last result-that wholesale prices do not have an allocative role-is instead a consequence of the fact that the dynamics of the price and quantity of retail goods is independent of wholesale prices:p t = q t andŷ t = q t . Thus, in case of one-time cost shocks, the only role of wholesale prices concerns the distribution of the rents between wholesalers and retailers.
An interesting special case is when retailers face prohibitively high production adjustment costs (i.e., for ! 1). In this case, intermediate trade takes place only along the extensive margin of adjustment. So, after a purely transitory cost shock, there is zero pass-through to retail prices, and the pass-through to wholesale prices is proportional to the bargaining power of retailers :p
The zero pass-through result stems directly from the search frictions. On the one hand, …rms can only increase production by forming new business relationships, so output becomes a state variable; it can only adjust with one month delay. On the other hand, since the demand function implies a one-to-one relationship between consumption and prices, the matching frictions impede the reaction of both consumption and retail prices. But, at the same time, …rms have no incentive to either create or destroy B2B relationships (modifying their search e¤ort) because the cost shock is purely transitory. Firms absorb the shock completely through changes in the markup. The wholesale price divides the burden of the markup adjustment between wholesalers and retailers, proportionally to the corresponding bargaining power. Hence, in an environment where …rms are hit by idiosyncratic cost shocks, our model can yield complete price rigidity and time-varying markups.
Persistent Cost Shocks
Though …rms are reluctant to engage in costly search activities when shocks are transitory, their reaction to persistent cost shocks is quite di¤erent. in a t ). The reduction in the units per match leads to an increase in retail prices, while the pass-through to wholesale prices is almost proportional to the bargaining power of retailers.
The e¤ects of the reduction in advertising and marketing show up in the …rst period after the shock and persist over time. The disinvestment in long-term relationships causes a prolonged reduction in the stock of B2B and in the total production of the industry. As a result, there is a persistent reaction of wholesale and retail prices. However, the pass-through to both retail and wholesale prices is still quite low, and most of the cost shock is absorbed through movements in the markup. Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of an increase in marginal costs for di¤erent values of the persistence of the shock: = 0; 0:6; 0:99. We see that, although the increase in marginal costs has a positive e¤ect on prices, the degree of pass-through is directly proportional to -being very short-lived for = 0. This is because the more persistent the cost shock, the higher the willingness of …rms to absorb the shock by reducing advertising and marketing e¤ort. The reduction in advertising and marketing leads to a decline in both B2B relationships and consumption.
Intuitively, if the shock is purely transitory, …rms expect costs to go back to normal levels immediately after, and adjusting advertising and marketing is not an option for them. On the other hand, a persistent shock signals that marginal costs shall be high for many periods ahead, so …rms do not mind losing business relationships. The real e¤ects on consumption are consequently larger and considerably more persistent in this second case.
These results suggest that …rms have a preference for the intensive margin or the extensive margin, depending on the persistence of the shock. Firms absorb cost shocks along the intensive margin when shocks are transitory and along the extensive margin when shocks are persistent. 19 Nonetheless, the pass-through is never complete for reasonable calibrations.
Bargaining, Trading Frictions and Prices
As Corollary 3 shows for the case of transitory cost shocks, the pass-through to prices depends remarkably on the adjustment costs along the intensive margin and the bargaining power of the …rms in a contract. In this section, we study the e¤ect of these two factors in the case of persistent cost shocks. Consistently with Nakamura and Zerom's (2010) …nding that cost shocks in the co¤ee industry are highly persistent, we carry out this exercise setting = 0:95. 20 2 0 Nakamura and Zerom (2010) …nd that, in the co¤ee industry, a Dickey-Fuller test for the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% level. For simplicity, we focus here on very persistent, but stationary, cost processes. 2 1 In our model there are two ways to achieve complete pass-through to both retail and wholesale prices. The …rst way is to eliminate the curvature on q, letting ! 0. The second way is to eliminate search frictions, letting ! 0. Figure 3 displays the pass-through of costs to prices for increasing values of retailers'bargaining power . The …rst graph of Figure 3 shows the impact response of prices to a one percent increase in marginal costs, the second graph the response of prices to an increase in marginal costs after one year.
Adjustment Costs on the Intensive Margin and Pass-Through

Bargaining Power and Pass-Through
Retailers'bargaining power a¤ects the pass-through to wholesale prices and to retail prices di¤erently. The pass-through to wholesale prices is increasing in , both on impact and after one year. On the other hand, the pass-through to retail prices is non-monotonic in : it is maximum when the Hosios condition is met, and decreases symmetrically as we move away from = 1 :
At …rst sight, the idea that the reaction of wholesale prices to wholesalers' marginal cost shocks gets larger with retailers' bargaining power may seem counterintuitive. It would be reasonable to expect that retailers force wholesalers to absorb the shock keeping the bargained price unchanged, the more, the larger .
To clarify this result, consider the evolution of the bargained wholesale price:
The wholesale price depends on the reservation price of wholesalers (…rst term) and the reservation price of retailers (second term). When wholesalers have most of the bargaining power (i.e., for low ), they get the most of the surplus from a business relationship. In this case, the wholesale price is strictly related to the retailers'reservation price. At the limit (i.e., for ! 0), there is not even a direct link between marginal cost shocks, The pass-through to retail prices depends on how easy it is to adjust production, respectively, along the extensive margin and along the intensive margin:
The bargaining power does not in ‡uencep t directly but only indirectly. The indirect e¤ect is a consequence of the fact that the matching process is more or less e¢ cient depending on . This a¤ectsT t and is the cause of the inverted-U shape ofp t with respect to . 22 When = 1 = 0:5, the matching process is Pareto e¢ cient and the search externalities are internalized. The large pass-through to retail prices stems from the large variation along the extensive margin. In contrast, when either retailers or wholesalers have most of the bargaining power (i.e., = 0:1 or = 0:9), there are search externalities and the adjustment along the extensive margin gets very expensive for either side of the product market. That is, the product market is very tight and the matching process sclerotic. However, the overall e¤ect of on the pass-through to retail goods is very small in comparison with its e¤ect on the pass-through to wholesale prices.
In general, therefore, conditional on the cost shock being su¢ ciently persistent, the size of the pass-through depends on two key parameters of the model: (for both the wholesale price and the retail price) and (especially for the wholesale price). To assess which values of these parameters could be deemed more empirically relevant, we ran a simple experiment and evaluated the ability of the model to reproduce some leading results in the empirical literature. In particular, we simulated our model and determined which calibration allows it to approximately replicate the degree of pass-through estimated by Nakamura and Zerom (2010) for the co¤ee industry. They …nd that the pass-through of cost shocks to prices is very low and delayed (starting mostly in the second quarter after the shock), the major cause of the delay being the response of wholesale prices. A characteristic of the co¤ee industry is that there is a group of big wholesalers in the market (e.g., Procter & Gamble and Kraft), and we acknowledge that our model cannot properly account for this. Yet, if we concede that the results obtained by retailers'production to changes in the quantity of inputs is su¢ ciently sluggish ( = 10). We describe this experiment in detail in appendix C. In our model, the allocative power of wholesale prices depends on the persistence of the change in this price. When the price change is purely transitory, wholesale prices only play a distributive role; they are not allocative (Corollary 3). When the price change is expected to last in the future, there is instead a potentially allocative role for wholesale prices, on top of their distributive role. This happens because the incentive for …rms to engage in costly search activities depends on the expected bene…ts of a B2B relationship, which are in turn in ‡uenced by the future expected wholesale price. So the question to answer next is: to what extent are wholesale prices allocative when an industry is exposed to persistent shocks?
On the Allocative Role of Wholesale Prices
To answer this question, we look at the response of retail prices and consumption to a persistent increase in wholesale prices. Interestingly, this can be interpreted as a negative shock to retailers' bargaining power,^ t , for this shock a¤ects wholesale prices but not retail prices.
Formally:
. 23 An increase in the bargaining power of wholesalers (i.e. a reduction of^ t ) raisesp W t and is thus equivalent to an exogenous shock to wholesale prices. between the two models, we scale the bargaining shock in the context of the B2B model in such a way that the impact increase inp W t is the same as the one in the Dixit-Stigliz (1997) model. 24 2 3 Note that, ceteris paribus, the persistence of the bargaining power shock reduces the response of wholesale prices to the bargaining power shock. This is a consequence of the repeated nature of the interactions between …rms. So bargaining …rms look into the future and account for the expected continuation value of a match. For instance, retailers are willing to accept a higher wholesale price today if they expect to get a high share of the surplus in the future. 2 4 In the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model the pass-through of wholesale price shocks to retail prices is complete, i.e.pt =pW t. Consumption is then obtained using the sectorial demand condition:ĉt = pt = pW t: The Speci…cally, wholesale prices increase by 1 percent on impact.
In the standard monopolistic competition model, an increase in wholesale prices causes a proportional increase in retail prices (the pass-through is complete) and a strong reduction in …nal goods consumptionŷ t . In the B2B model, the response of retail prices and consumption depends crucially on the initial conditions in the product market. Speci…cally, it depends on the initial bargaining power of the two parties. When wholesalers have most of the bargaining power ( = 0:1), the increase in wholesale prices leads to a reduction in consumption and to an increase in retail prices, as in Dixit-Stiglitz. When retailers are the dominant party in the negotiations ( = 0:9), an increase in wholesale price has opposite e¤ects to those in DixitStiglitz: consumption increases and retail prices falls. Finally, if the two parties have fully symmetric bargaining power ( = 0:5), wholesale price shocks do not a¤ect both retail prices and consumption. In this case,p W t does not have any allocative power.
These, perhaps surprising, results are due to the search externalities in the product market.
A persistent increase in wholesale prices raises the expected value of business relationships for wholesalers but reduces that for retailers. Consequently, following the shock wholesalers increase their search intensity, while retailers reduce it. But the intensity of these reactions depends on the initial bargaining power. When wholesalers have most of the bargaining power ( = 0:1 < 1 ), the product market is very tight on the side of wholesalers, and the bargaining power shock only worsens the situation. The formation of new matches is strongly reduced because retailers are reluctant to make search e¤orts, and this is only partly compensated by an increase in the intensive margin. Total consumption decreases and the pass-through to retail prices is positive but delayed. On the contrary, when wholesalers are the weak party in the negotiations ( = 0:9 > 1 ), the wholesale price shock reduces the tightness of the market, and improves the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The number of business relationships increases, leading to higher consumption and lower retail prices. When the Hosios condition is veri…ed ( = 0:5 = 1 ), the additional search e¤ort by wholesalers o¤sets the reduction in retailers'search e¤ort one-for-one, so the stock of business relationships, …nal consumption and retail prices remain constant. 25 evolution of wholesale prices,pW t, in the Dixit-Stiglitz model is modeled as an AR (1) process with persistence . This is identical to the evolution ofpW t in the B2B model when = 0:5. These results suggest two conclusions regarding the allocative power of wholesale prices.
First, persistent wholesale price ‡uctuations do retain some signalling power in industries characterized by long-term contracts and e¢ cient bargaining. Yet, this allocative power works through a di¤erent channel, which depends on the incentives of …rms to engage in costly advertising and purchasing activities. For this reason, the e¤ect is considerably delayed and much more persistent than in the standard monopolistic competition model. Second, the e¤ect of wholesale price ‡uctuations on retail prices and consumption depends on search externalities.
Search externalities show up whenever the Hosios condition fails to apply, that is, whenever
Product Market Equilibrium in Open Economy
There According to the standard channel, exchange rate shocks cause expenditure switching-that is, a¤ect consumption in the importing country-to the extent that import prices vary and adjust to these shocks. 26 In the context of our model, the border prices are the wholesale prices set through long-term relationships between …rms of di¤erent countries, so search and bargaining frictions can a¤ect the responsiveness of border prices to exchange rate shocks. An interesting question is thus to determine how important the reaction of wholesale prices to exchange rate shocks is for expenditure switching.
In what follows, we present an open economy extension of our model, under the standard assumption that changes in the exchange rate are exogenous to the dynamics of the industry under analysis. Foreign variables are denoted by a 'star.'
An Extended Framework
Wholesale …rms produce intermediate goods in the home country and sell these goods both in their own country and in the foreign country. To this end, wholesalers need to establish long-term relationships with retailers operating in each market. 27 Retailers of a given country transform intermediate goods into …nal goods and sell these goods only to resident consumers. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that home country wholesalers are specialized in the production of industry i goods and, consequently, do not face competition from foreign wholesalers. We leave this interesting extension for future research. Moreover, since there is symmetry between …rms, we continue to save notation and omit …rm-speci…c indexes.
Retailers. The retail sector in the home country is identical to the retail sector of the closed-economy version of the model. The demand function for the goods produced by this sector is given by equation (1), and the …rst order conditions of its pro…t maximization problem are equations (9) (10).
The foreign retail sector is analogous to the home country retail sector, with the only di¤er-ence that price variables are denominated in foreign currency. Foreign retailers are an in…nite number of …rms with unit measure, and the demand function for the consumption goods these …rms produce is:
where p t is the foreign retail price in units of the foreign currency and A is a parameter. 28 The 2 7 As in Drozd and Nosal (2012) , the need to establish B2B relationships with both home and foreign retailers represents a natural justi…cation for the international segmentation among product markets. 2 8 This parameter is a replacement for aggregate consumption, C t , and the aggregate price level, P t . C t and P t are both exogenous to the industry under analysis, and the standard demand function-c t = (p t =P t ) C tsimpli…es as shown.
…rst-order conditions for the maximization of current and future expected pro…ts are:
where the cost parameter f , the marginal value of B2B relationships to the foreign retailer, J t , and the bargained wholesale price of B2B contracts in the foreign country, p W t , are all expressed in units of the foreign currency. x Rt = d t =T t is the search intensity of the foreign retailer, which leads to the formation of new business relationships with home country wholesalers at rate
. This rate depends on the foreign goods market tightness-t a t =d t -and is taken as given by the retailer.
Wholesalers. Home country wholesalers make deals not only with local retailers, but also with foreign retailers. The value function of the wholesaler is now given by:
at;a t ;T t+1 ;T t+1
wt + E t w T t+1 ; T t+1 ; s t+1 ;
where T t is the number of business relationships with the foreign country, s t = (mc t ; e t ) is the vector of exogenous states and wt are the current pro…ts. These are denominated in units of the domestic currency and given by:
where x wt = a t =T t and x wt = a t =T t are the intensities to search for buyers in the home market and in the foreign market, respectively. Therefore, the …rm is not only exposed to industryspeci…c marginal cost shocks, but also to the aggregate ‡uctuations in the nominal exchange rate e t , which alter the valuation of the foreign sales price and search costs. 29 The value function (18) is constrained by the law of motions for home and foreign customer bases, which are given by equation ( (4)- (5)). The optimal choices for transactions with foreign customers are instead as follows:
where W t @ w (T t ; T t ; s t ) =@T t is in units of the home currency. Therefore, accounting for the expected change in the exchange rate, both equations are expressed in units of the foreign currency.
Equation (19) shows that the marginal cost of search in the foreign market (on the left hand side) must equal the future value of a B2B relationship with foreign retailers. Equation (20) shows that the current value of customer relationships W t must equal the current and future bene…ts of getting into these relationships. The exchange rate in ‡uences these bene…ts in two ways. First, the current exchange rate a¤ects the pro…t margin of the wholesale sector, acting as a marginal cost shock with opposite sign. Second, the expected change in the exchange rate interacts with the future value of B2B relationships, as a re ‡ection of the reward needed to invest in search activities (equation (19)).
Bargaining and Expenditure-Switching
Home wholesalers and foreign retailers bargain over prices and quantities to maximize the total surplus in the foreign product market. The solution of this Nash bargaining problem for foreign wholesale prices and quantities are, respectively,
where is the bargaining power of foreign retailers and
x Rt q t are the savings in the costs of searching for and forming B2B relationships.
According to equation (21) , the optimal wholesale price is a weighted average of the valuation of the intermediate good by home wholesalers and that by foreign retailers-…rst and second terms, respectively. This opens the way to pricing to market. Equation (22) suggests that the marginal cost of adjusting production along the intensive margin (the left hand side) equals the bene…t of exchanging one additional unit of the good in the foreign retail market (the total pro…t margin on the right hand side).
The nominal exchange rate in ‡uences both the bargained price and the bargained quantity per match. Equation (22) shows that an exchange rate appreciation-a reduction in e t -leads to a negative adjustment along the intensive margin. The quantity per match q t falls below the desired long-run level q , and this decline is more pronounced, the easier for retailers to absorb the shock by adjusting their production (i.e., the lower ). In fact, formally,q t =
[mc= (ep q )] (p t c mc t +ê t ). Intuitively, the reduction in e t raises the foreign currency value of the marginal costs of producing intermediate goods at home, causing the total surplus generated by contracts in the foreign market to fall, and so does q t .
This mechanism in ‡uences the response of the wholesale price as well. In fact, from equation (21), one of the e¤ects of the exchange rate appreciation is that p W t needs to increase as a result of the marginal increase in the costs mc t =e t in the wholesale sector. Yet note that, di¤erently from its e¤ect on q t , the e¤ect of the increase in mc t =e t on p W t depends forcefully on the bargaining power of the parties in the contract; speci…cally, on the bargaining power of foreign retailers . The response of the wholesale price to the exchange rate appreciation is also a function of the way wholesalers adjust their savings in the costs of search, W t , 30 and on the change in retailers'reservation price through p t and q t . While the e¤ect of the reaction of W t gets stronger for increasing values of , as it does that of the response of mc t =e t , the reaction of retailers'valuation gets progressively smaller.
All in all, since exchange rate shocks a¤ect both the bargained quantity per match q t and the bargained wholesale price p W t , the exchange rate has expenditure switching e¤ects but not through the conventional channel. In the model, a shock to the exchange rate a¤ects the 3 0 Optimal bargaining with foreign retailers implies a bargaining rule similar to the one for the home product market. This is W t = (1 ) J t . There is however a di¤erence between the two cases. The di¤erence stems from the fact that the bargaining rule for the foreign market is expressed in foreign currency value terms, as it is the cost of search at foreign. So, wholesalers need to account for future evolutions in the exchange rate, while retailers do not. See equations (16)- (19) .
total surplus maximized in a match between home wholesalers and foreign retailers. Working through the total pro…t margin p t mc t =e t , this e¤ect of the shock on the total surplus has direct implications for q t and foreign consumption, independently of the response of the intermediate border price p W t . In fact, the quantity per match reacts to the shock, unless the costs of adjusting production along the intensive margin are extraordinarily high ( is very large). In this sense, there is a sort of disconnect between the reaction of quantities and that of wholesale prices. The reaction of q t is not a direct function of the degree of the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to wholesale prices. The ERPT to wholesale prices can change with , but neither nor p W t are direct determinants of q t .
Quantitative Results
Let the nominal exchange rate be an AR (1) process:
where e 2 [0; 1) is the persistence of ‡uctuations in the exchange rate and " e;t is an i.i.d. shock.
Since nominal exchange rates are often close to a unit root, we set e = 0:99 and study the e¤ects of a decrease in the nominal exchange rate on prices and on search and matching.
In general, prices and quantities are driven by the same key factors a¤ecting the dynamics of prices and quantity in closed-economy. 31 Figure 7 shows the e¤ects of the currency appreciation on prices and quantity for di¤erent values of the adjustment cost parameter . In particular, the …rst two diagrams measure the pass-through to prices on impact (left graph) and after one year (right graph). The remaining four diagrams show the responses of variables concerning the extensive and intensive margins of adjustment.
Regardless of the size of the adjustment costs, the ERPT to retail prices is systematically lower than the ERPT to wholesale prices. This is consistent with the large set of empirical …ndings reviewed by Burstein and Gopinath (2013) . Moreover, for intermediate values of (i.e., for = 1), exchange rate shocks have a rather limited impact e¤ect on prices. The e¤ect of the shock grows larger twelve months after its occurrence, yet the ERPT remains incomplete: it is around 60 percent, for retail prices, and around 75 percent, for wholesale prices. This is due to the fact that home wholesalers and foreign retailers react to the currency appreciation adjusting along both the intensive margin and the extensive margin. The adjustment of q t along the intensive margin is due to the increase in the foreign currency value of the marginal costs of intermediate goods production. The adjustment of p W t along the extensive margin is due to both this reaction of the marginal costs and the e¤ect of the shock on the search e¤ort by wholesalers, which in fact falls alongside the number of B2B relationships established in the foreign country. For smaller adjustment costs (i.e., for ! 0), there is a sounder decline in the quantity per match, a larger degree of ERPT to prices, and correspondingly less need to reduce the number of B2B relationships in place. The reverse is true for industries where foreign retailers …nd it very hard to adjust their production (i.e., for = 100000), in which case the ERPT is rather limited. The degree of pass-through to wholesale prices depends markedly on the value assumed by , but has limited e¤ects on both retail prices and consumption. The pass-through to p W t is increasing in , both on impact and after 12 months. But the increase in the pass-through to p W t has weak consequences for the real side of trade. The response of the quantity per match to the appreciation is almost independent of the bargaining power of the …rms. This has a slightly larger e¤ect on the extensive margin of trade, for the e¢ ciency of the matches in the international product market is a function of . Overall, the responses of B2B relationships, of retail prices and of …nal consumption reach a maximum when = 0:5-i.e., when the Hosios condition holds-and decrease symmetrically as we move away from this value.
Interestingly, this con…rms that there is a sort of disconnect between the ERPT to the price of imported intermediate goods and …nal consumption. When foreign retailers'bargaining power goes from 0:5 towards 1, the increase in the ERPT to wholesale prices is associated with a reduction in the ERPT to retail prices and in expenditure switching. In this sense, Figure   8 provides a visual indication of the fact that the expenditure switching e¤ect of the exchange rate appreciation is not necessarily either captured or triggered by a change in import prices. It rather depends on the costs of adjusting production along the intensive and extensive margins.
Robustness. We have made the assumption that home wholesalers and foreign retailers bargain over p W t , which is denominated in foreign currency. This assumption is, for instance, in line with the fact that U.S. imports are priced in dollars (Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008) and that large transactions are likely to be invoiced in the importers'currency (Goldberg and Tille, 2009 ).
However, as it is simple to see, the results do not depend on the currency of denomination of the wholesale price. Speci…cally, the results would not change if we assumed that …rms bargained over a price denominated in home currency. This is because what the alternative assumption implies is a change in the currency of denomination of …rms'pro…ts and hence of the optimal sharing rule of the Nash-bargaining problem. While equation (21) is the optimal solution of a sharing rule expressed in units of the foreign currency, under the alternative assumption the bargained price is the solution of a sharing rule denominated in the home currency. We have in fact checked that, converted back into foreign currency, the latter solution is equivalent to equation (21).
Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model of pricing in the context of business relationships between wholesalers and retailers in the product market. This characterization of the product market is in line with a number of recent studies emphasizing that …rms need to establish long-term relationships to expand trade. The search frictions that a¤ect the adjustment of the customer base to shocks are thus key to the behaviour of prices.
We have speci…cally distinguished between intensive and extensive margins of adjustment.
We have found that the intensive margin of adjustment depends mostly on how costly is for retailers to transform wholesale goods into …nal goods. The convenience to invest in new B2B
relationships along the extensive margin is instead a function of the persistence of shocks. We have analyzed how these two sources of adjustment interplay and found that this interaction a¤ects the pass-through of exchange rate and other cost shocks to prices. The pass-through tends to be low under various parametrizations and is almost always incomplete. One of the main drivers of the pass-through is the bargaining power of retailers, which can limit the allocative power of wholesale prices, in closed economy, and can restrain the expenditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate shocks, in closed economy. But we have found that in none of these two cases the pass-through of cost shocks to wholesale prices is informative of how wholesalers and retailers agree to adjust trade after a cost shock. In this sense, our results suggests that, when it comes to industries where bargaining and long-term relationships are the rule, it could be misleading to use the ERPT as the sole metric of the expenditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate shocks. max fyt;qt;Tt;at;dtg
subject to the technological constraints on the extensive margin (matching frictions) and intensive margin (adjustment costs):
Equation (23) is based on the fact that, due symmetry in preferences and technology, e¢ ciency requires that identical quantities of each good be produced by each wholesaler and each retailer. The …rst order conditions are:
where t is the social value of a match at the margin. To compare the social planner's optimality conditions with those of the decentralized equilibrium, let us rewrite the latter as follows:
where t = W t + J t . It is now easy to see that 1 = is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the constrained e¢ cient solution (24) (27) to be equivalent to the decentralized solution (28) (31).
B Proof of Proposition 2
When it is purely transitory, a marginal cost shock has no e¤ect on the expected future value of a business relationship (E tŴt+1 = E tĴt+1 = 0). Consequently, wholesalers and retailers have no incentive to adjust their search intensities to the shock:x wt = E tŴt+1 =x Rt = E tĴt+1 = 0. The problem becomes static because, with search e¤orts being constant, also the number of B2B relationships remains unchanged.
From the log-linearization of the market clearing condition, p t =ŷ t , follows:
where =! (1 (q q)) captures the curvature of the production function of retailers with respect toq t . Plugging (32) into the log-linearization of (13) yields:
where
captures the elasticity ofq t to changes in the total pro…t margin, and
tot q is a decreasing function of . Using equation (33) back into (32), we get
where B q is decreasing in both and . Combining (33) and (34) with the log-linearization of (12), we …nally obtain:
where A q captures the elasticity of the wholesale price to changes inq t , and is a decreasing function of .
C Reconciling the Model with Nakamura and Zerom (2010)
Analyzing data on trade in the co¤ee market, Nakamura and Zerom (2010) obtain three major results: 1) the pass-through of marginal cost shocks to wholesale and retail prices is quite low (less than a third of a percent in total); 2) it is delayed, in the sense that prices start to adjust in the second quarter after the shock or later; 3) most of the delayed pass-through occurs at the wholesale level, in the sense that wholesale and retail prices move very closely together. The co¤ee market presents features that our model cannot properly account for. In particular, in the co¤ee market there are a few large wholesalers with some market power; we abstract from this in our model. Nevertheless, if we concede that the results obtained by Nakamura and Zerom (2010) for the co¤ee industry may actually be more regular across many markets (as the analysis by Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010, seem to suggest), then it is interesting to see to what extent our model can account for those results. This means …nding the right mix of parameters that can deliver a low and delayed pass-through, without imposing price stickiness from the very beginning.
In particular, since in our model …rms do not feel the need to search unless cost shocks are su¢ ciently persistent (corresponding, for example, to exchange rate shocks being empirically close to a unit root), we seek to determine what combination ( ; ) can reproduce the results of Nakamura and Zerom (2010) for = 0:95. This is our baseline calibration for the persistence of the shock. We simulated our model and obtained samples of 2900 quarters, by changing the frequency of the arti…cial data from monthly (our baseline calibration) to quarterly (Nakamura and Zerom, 2010) . The selected sample size is close to the number of observations that Nakamura and Zerom (2010) use in two of the three exercises that we aim to replicate with our model. 32 We rad the simulations for 500 times. To assess the degree of pass-through of marginal costs shocks to wholesale and retail prices, we then run the following regressions on the simulated data:
where the index z is simply capturing the fact that we run a regression for the wholesale price and one for the retail price. z and zk are the parameters to estimate and u zt is a zero-mean residual term. Note that this equation has the same form, and the same number of lags, as the one estimated by Nakamura and Zerom (2010). 33 The coe¢ cients zk can be be interpreted as the percentage change in prices associated with a one percent change in marginal costs that took place k quarters before. The sum P 6 k=0 zk measures the long-run pass-through. 34 Table 3 presents the results of the pass-through regression for wholesale and retail prices. First, we need wholesalers to have most of the bargaining power: we set = 0:1. In fact, when wholesalers have a strong bargaining power, wholesale prices are closely related to retail prices. In this case, wholesalers internalize most of the surplus from a match, and the pass-through to wholesale prices is rather limited. Second, we need a relatively high curvature along the intensive margin (i.e., = 10) to prevent the quantity of intermediate inputs transacted within a match from displaying a large impact reaction. Under these two assumptions, the model can replicate the low and delayed pass-through of costs shocks to wholesale and retail prices. The long-run pass-through of cost shocks to retail and wholesale prices, however, is still slightly higher than that in the data. This is mainly because the e¤ects of the cost shock are more persistent in the model than in the data.
Finally, to measure the extent to which the delayed pass-through is due to the reaction of wholesale prices, which then feeds into retail prices, we measure the sensitivity of the retail price to the intermediate goods price by estimating:
where we use the tilde to distinguish the coe¢ cients and residual of this regression from the 3 2 In particular, the sample size of 2900 quarters is close to the number of observations that Nakamura and Zerom (2010) use for estimating the pass-through of cost shocks to wholesale prices and the pass-through of changes in the wholesale prices to retail prices. For the pass-through of cost shocks to retail prices, they actually have a bigger sample, but using a bigger sample of simulated data does not a¤ect our estimates. However, there is no exact correspondence between our samples and theirs. Nakamura and Zerom (2010) work with panel data, while we only have the time dimension. 3 3 The only di¤erence is that, to account for seasonality, Nakamura and Zerom (2010) include in their regressions a quarter of the year dummy. 3 4 See also Goldberg and Campa (2006) . previous one. As before, the form of this regression is consistent with the empirical strategy of Nakamura and Zerom (2010). The results of this exercise-shown in Table 4 -are more mixed. On one side, the pass-through of wholesale prices to retail prices is more delayed in the model than in the data. In the model most of the reaction of the wholesale price passes through to the retail price in the …rst two quarters, especially in the second. In contrast, in the data most of the adjustment occurs in the …rst quarter. On the other side, however, we get close to the data in that the overall pass-through (i.e., P 2 k=0~ ik ) approaches 1; it is about 0.9 in both cases. The model takes three quarters to reproduce this long-run pass-through of wholesale prices to retail prices.
Overall, considering that our model is fairly simple and abstracts from many important aspects (e.g., local costs and price negotiation costs), the results of this experiment seem encouraging, in the sense that search and bargaining between businesses has the potential to contribute to explaining the low and delayed pass-through in the data. The calibration that supports these results is: = 0:1; = 10. The model is simulated 500 times for 2900 periods. The coe¢ cients estimated by Nakamura and Zerom (2010) are from Table 2 in their paper. Standard errors are in parentheses. The shock is an increase in the wholesale price p W t caused by a one unit decrease in the bargaining power . For each initial value of , the persistence of the shock is set to = 0:95. The shock is a one unit decrease in the nominal exchange rate. For each bargaining power of foreign retailers , the persistence of the shock is set to e = 0:99.
